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Prior to the 1974 reorganisation of local government there were 
four Scottish local authority associations. Now there is only one 
The Convention of Scottish Local Authorities (COSLA). In the 1976 
edition of this Yearbook, Robert Peggie, Chief Executive of Lothian 
Regional Council, praised 
claimed that COSLA was this development. He 
one of "the outstanding achievements" of the new system and "a credit 
sense of regional and district councils to the judgement and good 
throughout Scotland."(!) 
The argument that it is best to have a single association, re-
presenting all local authorities, is not new. It is widely believed 
that one association, presenting a united front to central government, 
strengthens the position of local government. ( 2 ) But while the new 
Scottish councils had, (in Peggie's view), the "judgement" and "good 
sense" to establish a single association, their English and Welsh 
counterparts did not. They formed three separate associations. ( 3 ) 
As a local authority association, COSLA's main aim is to repre-
sent the views of member authorities and to defend their interests. 
But since COSLA represents all Scottish local authorities some argue 
that its role in Scottish government could be expanded. In 1979, a 
few weeks after the devolution referendum, Professor Lewis Gunn of 
Strathclyde University suggested to COSLA•s Annual Conference that it 
should adopt a wider role in pre-legislative decision-making and that 
it should become the basis 
Scottish Convention. This 
proposals for an indirect-
for some kind of 
idea is a reformulation of Lord Home's 1969 
ly elected Scottish Convention. The body which Professor Gunn proposed 
would have members from all Scotland's local authorities at its basis, 
but these councillors would be joined by members from "functional" 
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constituencies such as the S.T.U.C., the Scottish C.B.I., farmers, 
fishermen and colleges. This Convention would therefore "be a similar 
body to COSLA, but its remit would go beyond the field of local govern-
ment (and it) would have an 'advisory, consultative and inquisitory' 




Professor Gunn's suggestion captured the imagination of many 
COSLA members, but it is ill-conceived. On non-local government matt-
ers neither councillors nor associations are representative of a wid-
er public. And even when they express views on local authority matters, 
the structure of local government, for example,these are more in keep-
ing with sectional local government interests than with a more general 
"public interest."(S) 
COSLA members may be taken by the idea of expanding their role, 
yet some doubt that the Convention is capable of performing its pre-
sent duties as a local authority association. Like all associations, 
COSLA exists "to watch over, protect and promote the respective in-
terests, rights powers and duties of its member authorities as these 
,.(6) 
might be affected by legislation or proposed legislation ... 
One piece of legislation which will affect local authorities is the 
Tenants Rights (Scotland) Act which forces local authorities to sell 
council houses to sitting tenants and gives tenants in the public 
rented sector certain rights. This legislation will seriously erode 
local authorities' control over their housing stock, yet COSLA played 
a very small part in the discussions of the Bill as it went through 
Parliament. COSLA's failure to comment on many of the clauses provoked 
criticism from Scottish M.P.s when the Bill was in committee. One of 
the Labour members, Martin O'Neill, claimed that "the evidence and 
support the Committee has received from COSLA has been absolutely 
feeble. It has sent us lists of observations that could have been 
written on the back of a postcard in 20 minutes."(?) This sentiment 
was echoed by Gordon Wilson of the SNP who said that he was "shocked 
by the absence of adequate representation from COSLA."(B) 
The minor role COSLA played in discussion of this legislation 
was highlighted by the activities of other organisations. The three 
associations in England and Wales made many observations on the leg-
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islation which affected them and, in the absence of comment from 
their observations were sometimes introduced by members in 
ish committee. Shelter was another organisation with which COSLA was 
unfavourably compared. COSLA did not send an observer to the committee
meetings of the Bill, yet Shelter, with considerably fewer resources 
than COSLA, managed to have a representative in attendance. 
By far the best example of COSLA's failure to speak on matters 
of crucial concern to its member authorities concerns the Stodart 
Committee of Inquiry. In 1979 this Committee was established to review 
the reorganised local government structure in Scotland 
commendations for (minor) reforms. It invited evidence from interest-
ed parties on whether the structure should be amended and, if so, 
how. In the face of internal disagreement between regional and dis-
trict members, COSLA opted out of this debate and did not present any 
evidence. The only local government views to reach the Committee came 
from individual authorities. 
But why has COSLA been so reticent on matters of obvious concern 
to Scottish local authorities? One reason is inadequate staffing and 
resources. In 1976 Robert Peggie argued that the full potential of 
COSLA would be realised only if constituent authorities recognised 
"the need to devote more effort and resources to the achievement of 
its accepted aims."(
9
) This has not been done. Tom Clarke, a former 
President of COSLA, once likened its organisation to a "penny-farthing 
machine in a jet-propelled age." In 1980-81 the Convention's annual 
budget is a mere £460,000. Its staff only number seventeen, and nine 
of these are typists. In the near future extra staff are to be employ-
ed but even then COSLA will not have the resources to parallel the 
work of the English bodies. 
The lack of financial support given to COSLA by member authori-
ties is not due to Scottish stinginess. When COSLA was formed some 
authorities had reservations about the viability of a single associa-
tion. Instead of ploughing resources into an organisation which might 
prove difficult to run, authorities decided to cat canny. In 1978, 
a constitutional crisis threatened the existence of COSLA and deferr-
ed the decision on finance. These troubles are past, but local gov-
ernment spending cuts now prevent a substantial rise in subscriptions 
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to COSLA being mooted. 
In the Committee for the Tenants' Rights (Scotland) Bill, Robin 
cook claimed: "it is traditional that when we have a rate support 
grant order debate, we receive the views of COSLA in the post the day 
after the debate, because COSLA has only one part-time member to carry 
out that kind of analysis."(lO) But there is a further reason why 
COSLA's comments on government proposals are often late; frequently 
they are not given enough time to discuss and comment on proposals 
submitted by the Scottish Office. Privately many Scottish Office 
officials admit this is the case, but claim they are unable to give 
COSLA longer to deliberate because they are in a similar position. 
Many proposals for legislation affecting Scottish local government 
emanate from the Department of the Environment. By the time the 
Scottish Office has received them, there is not enough time to sound 
out COSLA. 
So far resources and time have been cited as explanations for 
COSLA's weakness as a local authority association. But internal poli-
tics have sometimes proved a more important factor. Regional and dis-
trict authorities frequently disagree on important local government 
issues. So too do political parties. But, in order to preserve unity, 
COSLA seeks to avoid conflict. As in the case of evidence to the 
Stodart Committee of Inquiry, silence is the easiest way to shelve the 
problems generated by disagreement. 
In many respects COSLA is a boon to central government. It is 
convenient for the government to negotiate and consult with only 
association. Secondly, if there is agreement within COSLA and it 
one 
backs 
government policy, then this is an appreciable gain, as it may bol-
ster the government in the face of opposition from other interest 
groups. On the other hand, issues which are likely to divide central 
and local government - spending cuts, finance, local government reform, 
mandatory provision of services, for example are also likely to be 
divisive within COSLA. On these issues COSLA tends to protect its 
own fragile unity rather than to present a strong local government 
view to central government. 
The role COSLA plays in decision-making in Scotland can only be 











to throw some light on them. The first two sections outline how 
Scotland's single association was formed and how it operates. The 
third section documents the constitutional crisis o£ 1978-79 which 
threatened the existence o£ COSLA and the fourth analyses 
for it. This leads, in the penultimate section, to a more 
consideration o£ party political divisions within the Convention. 
last section considers COSLA's future. 
I 
The 1970's reorganisation o£ local government in Scotland was a 
more dramatic event than it was in England and Wales. Certainly £unc-
tions were reallocated and boundaries redrawn in England, but these 
changes appear cosmetic in comparison with the radical surgery endu 
by Scottish local government. The Wheatley 
isation to cure our ailing local authorities. Central government ad-
ministered the remedy and, following the passage o£ the Local Govern-
ment (Scotland) Act, almost none o£ the previous units o£ local gov-
ernment survived. 
The £our associations which had represented local authorities 
prior to 1974 were inevitable casualties o£ reform. The Association 
County Councils, the District Councils Association, the Convention 
Royal Burghs and the Counties o£ Cities Association were all too 
wedded to the old local government map to endure the chanqe to the 
o£ local government representation. 
In the absence o£ a lobby to maintain the status quo, the pros-
pect o£ a single association £or Scotland was much better than it 
ever was in England and Wales; there political considerations and 
entrenched interests militated against a single association being 
formed. (ll) The campaign £or one Scottish association was also helped 
by the simplicity o£ the new local government system. Whereas there 
are seven types o£ authority in the reformed English and Welsh struc-
ture, (lZ) in Scotland there are only three: regional, district and 
island authorities. In comparison with England where complicated plans 
for a federation were mooted, the choice £acing Scottish local authori-
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tieS was simple: did they want a single association or separate 
associations £or districts and regions?(l
3
) 
The running £or a single association was first made in 1969 £or 
although the decision on associations would be taken by the new auth-
orities, the Wheatley Report expressed a strong preference for one 
The Redcli££e Maud Report on England and Wales likewise association. 
argued £or unity. There is nothing surprising about this: we need not 
rehearse the detailed arguments in favour o£ a single association to 
see that it makes financial sense to concentrate sta££ and resources 
in one organisation and political sense £or local authorities to pre-
sent a united front to central government.· The Scottish Royal Commi-
ssioners were aware, however, that the logic o£ their argument, that 
the two tiers in the reorganised system must be their own masters and 
be able to act independently o£ one another, might be used to justify 
separate associations. But they maintained that as long as a single 
association allowed £or separate panels £or districts and regions -
guaranteeing independence on certain matters - it would be best i£ 
differences or competition between these two tiers were resolved with-
in one organisation. 
The major objection to a single association concerned the weak-
ness o£ district councils, £or they are small fry compared with the 
regional authorities who administer most o£ the large services and 
spend most local government money. Opponents o£ a single association 
argued that within one organisation the interests o£ districts might 
be quashed by the politically and financially powerful regions. Some 
opponents also argued that a single association might be weak, since 
"i£ there are conflicting views £rom the regions and districts any 
attempt to compromise so as to present a united viewpoint might £ail 
to do justice to either point o£ view."(l
4
) Proponents o£ a single 
association rejoined that districts might benefit £rom a joint organi-
sation with regions' Instead o£ district authorities being regarded 
by central government as the regional authorities' poor relation, 
they could be equal partners in a strong association. The Report o£ 
a Working Party o£ Officials set up to make recommendations on the 
future o£ the Scottish associations also argued that even i£ separate 
associations were formed this would not eliminate the likelihood o£ 
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squabbles between different kinds of authorities. Within a 
association, say, there might be a split between urban and 
trict councils and, in that case, it might be best if any shared 
terest between regions and districts within a 
openly expressed and not suppressed because the two 
sidering the matter separately. But the Report also 
much could be made of likely conflicts and, quoting Wheatley, 
out that a single association made sense since "there will always 
more common ground than disputed ground in local government."(lS) 
The Report of the Working Party came out strongly in favour of 
one association for Scotland. So too did the most influential of 
existing associations - the County Councils Association. Only the 
Convention of Royal Burghs remained firmly opposed. But, 
decision lay with the new authorities, it was the opinion of 
ly elected members which mattered. In July 1974 the Scottish 
ment Department convened a meeting of representatives of all 
authorities in Scotland so that such a decision could be made. The 
regional and island representatives were predominantly in favour of 
a single association. So too were a considerable number of 
representatives. But a number of district members remained unconvinced
The meeting resolved to set up a working party of 
representatives of the old associations to report to a 
on how the decision about the future should be reached 
single association were agreed upon, authorities would be represented 
in it. (l 6 ) 
The Working Party's Report, like its predecessor, was firmly 
committed to the principle of a single association. It argued that, 
with const~tutional safeguards and adequate representation for smaller 
authorities, it could serve the interests o~ all authorities in Scot-
land. In October a further meeting of representatives was convened at 
which they were asked to vote in principle for a single association 
along the lines dutlined in the Report. Cumbernauld District Council, 
one of the distrfcts most opposed to a single association, had tried 
to organise a separate association for district councils but obtained 
little support. Only twelve of the fifty three districts voted against 
a single association. The nine regions and three all-purpose island 
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authorities voted in favour. (l
7
) We may interpret this vote as a 
stimony to the overshelming desire by Scottish local authorities 




The inaugural meeting of the new association for Scotland - the 
Convention of Scottish Local Authorities, or COSLA as it is commonly 
called - was held in Glasgow in April 1975. Like its English counter-
parts, COSLA principally exists to protect and promote the interests, 
of its member authorities. It negotiates and consults with other nat-
ional bodies, such as The Manpower Services Commission whose work 
affects local authorities. The most significant negotiations each year 
are with civil servants and Ministers on the amount of the grant from 
central government to local government for the next financial year. 
It also exists to provide information and other services for its mem-
bers. For example it circulates information about nationally agreed 
salary and wage settlements affecting local government employees. It 
also makes recommendations to members about their per capita contri-
voluntary and semi public bodies, such as The 
Prevention of Cruelty to Children and The Scott-
bution to a host of 
Royal Society for the 
ish Arts Council. For such purposes, and for the efficient transaction 
of COSLA business, it 
cutive committees. But 
employs a small secretariat in Edinburgh. 
authorities themselves, operates through exe-
which have opened 
their meetings to the public, COSLA deliberates in private. There are 
four types of committee: joint, regional, district and island. Joint 
committees deal either with matters of common concern to all Scottish 
authorities - manpower and finance, for example - or with functions 
for which both regions and districts are responsible such as planning. 
Joint committees include members from regional, district and island 
councils. The most important joint committee, and indeed the most 
important of all COSLA committees, is the Convention Policy Committee. 
The committees for regional and district affairs are of two main 
types: policy and functional. The policy committees meet infrequent-
ly and exist simply to allow general discussion among authorities of 
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one type without the possibly inhibiting presence of authorities of 
another type. However, most important decisions about 
ment services are taken in the functional committees such as 
social work, and education. Only authorities 
with responsibility for 
to be represented (although the 
the specific function are entitled 
President and Vice 
President are ex officio members of all commi 
Thus, for example, the education committee is a regional committee 
which includes representatives from the island authorities 
also provide education. 
The representation of individual councils on committees 
lated in the Constitution. For Regional Committees 
order to reflect the different population sizes of 
is a sliding scale of representation. Strathclyde, the largest 
now has seven representatives while small regions like Borders 
Highland have one apiece. As there are many more districts than re-
gions the formula for representation on district committees is more 
complicated. The largest districts have a guaranteed number of 
Glasgow District, for example, has three. But for all small 
with populations up to one hundred thousand there. are only twenty 
places. Every four years there is 
a ballot to determine on which 
committees these small districts will be represented. Representation 
on joint committees is an amalgam of these two methods. That is to 
say, the regions and large districts have a stipulated number of 
representatives while the smaller 
districts ballot for places. 
Individual councils are thus awarded a set number 
COSLA committees. The choice 
of places on 
of representative is their decision. 
For a few years after COSLA•s inception some authorities appointed 
councillors to COSLA in proportion to the council's party strength. 
Now this is rarely done. As we shall see, local government and COSLA 
business have become more politicised and in order to influence 
00SLA
1
s political complexion, councils appoint representatives from 
the majority party. 
In addition to the committees there is the Convention meeting 
of about one hundred and fifty members which is convened approxi-
mately four times a year. It comprises representatives of all member 
authorities. The precise number of representatives per authority 
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varies according to population size but, in order to give worthwhile 
representation to smaller authorities, representation is weighted in 
their favour. Its most significant power is the election of the Presi-
dent and Vice-President - the figures who play an important part in 
the Convention Policy Committee and hence in local government deal-
ings with central government. At the Annual Meeting the Convention 
is also empowered to make amendments to the constitution. Full Con-
vention meetings are mainly devoted to receiving minutes from the 
executive committees. These minutes are principally for information 
and, only to a limited extent, debate for its power over the committees 
is confined to referring back an item for further consideration. This 
power can be used only if the matter has not already been acted upon 
and in no circumstance is any committee required to amend a decision 
which it has reached. Since the powers of Convention meetings are so 
limited, its deliberations are little more than a constitutional forma-
lity. Its size, of course, militates against it having policy-making 
powers, but since it could nevertheless ratify policy made in committ-
ees, as happens in the English and Welsh associations, it is not this 
which keeps it a toothless body. It is in fact the over-representation 
of smaller authorities and the co-existence of different tiers of 
authority which mean that all important decisions must be made in 
the committees. 
The issues of representation for member authorities and separate 
panels for districts, regions and islands are problems for COSLA. Con-
stitutionally the latter problem can be solved by having separate 
committees take decisions but this means that Convention meetings must 
be virtually powerless. Representation of member authorities poses a 
greater problem; how can adequate representation be given to authori-
ties with large populations while ensuring that they do not dominate 
and, conversely, how can sufficient representation and opportunity 
for involvement be given to smaller authorities so that they feel a 
constituent part of the association? This difficulty was partly eased 
by the attitude of the larger authorities and their commitment to a 
single association. At the first meeting of the representatives of 
new authorities, Geoff Shaw, then Convener of Strathclyde Regional 








of dominating a united association. 11 (l8 ) Subsequently the archi 
of COSLA•s constitution were able to under-represent 
ber authorities. For example, Strathclyde 
land's population - was allocated five of the one hundred and fn..-+u_.,
three representatives on the full Convention 
of only nine thousand was awarded one. 
The large districts and regions were underrepresented at Conven-~
tion meetings, but the significance of this was limited to 
these meetings had little executive power. However, aside from 
ing the leaders and thus determining the political complexion of 
COSLA8s public face, the full Convention had an important latent 
er: at its Annual Meeting it could amend the constitution. Through 
this smaller authorities had the numerical strength to 
balance of power and dominate the association. This is 
happened in COSLA in 1978. The following account of the consti 
crisis which almost ripped COSLA apart, not only relates an 
ing episode in Scottish political history, but also gives a glimpse 
into the divisions within Scottish local government. 
III 
Towards the end of 1977 some rural authorities were becoming dis~
satisfied with their position in COSLA. They argued it was no longer 
serving the interests of the rural areas because it was too dominated 
by authorities in the industrial central belt - Strathclyde, Central, 
Fife and Lothian and the districts within them. With hindsight it is 
not difficult to understand why this conflict surfaced in 1977, for 
that year rural areas lost money to urban authorities in the annual 
allocation of the Rate Support Grant. This shift in resources also 
occurred in England and Wales, but instead of seeing this urban bias 
as part of a political choice made by a Labour Government, rural auth-
orities in Scotland claimed COSLA was partly to blame. They argued 
that they were becoming the Cinderella of local government because 
they were under-represented on the COSLA sub-committee which negot-
iated with the Secretar,r of State on local government finance. The 
Borders, for example, which spearheaded the campaign in COSLA for a 
better deal for rural authorities, had neither a district nor a reg-
ional representative on this vital committee. 
116 
The aggrieved rural authorities argued that urban domination of 
CQSLA was not restricted to financial negotiations, for the authori-
ties in the central belt had the lion.•s share of committee chairman-
ships. In 1977-78, of the six regional committee chairmanships, Strath-
clyde held three, Lothian held two and Fife held one. This meant that 
all six offices were filled by councillors from predominantly urban, 
Labour authorities. In district committees too all four chairmanships 
were won by councillors from district authorities in Strathclyde or 
Lothian regions. And in the joint committees Strathclyde had three of 
the four available offices. To add insult to injury this pattern of 
urban hegemony was replicated in the appointments COSLA annually made 
to other bodies. For those already sensitive to the pre-eminence of 
urban regions the fact that Strathclyde•s staff provided public re-
lations for the Convention was an additional cause for complaint. 
But why were councillors from these authorities so powerful? 
This hegemony cannot be explained simply by numerical strength, for 
in relation to population they were under-represented and they did 
not form a coherent majority group. For example, Strathclyde Regional 
Council had only four places on the twenty eight strong Convention 
Policy Committee. To understand the dominant, although not necessarily 
domineering position of urban authorities like Strathclyde, we cannot 
rely on simple arithmetic and must consider other factors. 
One such factor is geography. It is not surprising in a country 
like Scotland, where population and industry are concentrated in a 
relatively small part of the whole country, that members from urban 
areas can participate more easily in COSLA business than those from 
outlying rural areas. As most COSLA and related meetings are held in 
Edinburgh, the attendance record of rural members, particularly those 
from the Highlands and Islands, is understandably low. Because party 
political affiliation is substantially influenced by geography, urban 
areas being traditional Labour strongholds, the preponderance of ur-
ban activists in COSLA has also meant the pre-eminence of Labour mem-
bers. But this brings us to consider the most important explanation 
for the dominance of urban authorities in the activities of the Con-
vention: the operation of party politics. With a minimum amount of 




was able to enhance its chances of obtaining office on the regional 
and joint committees. As the group system successfully concentrated 
the leadership of committees in the hands of members from urban Labou
Scotland, pre-meetings of the Labour Group were a constant source of 
irritation to rural members. This irritation is understandable if we 
bear in mind that most were Independent councillors and so ostensibly 
hostile to organised party politics in local government. 
Many of the rural members were angry about political caucuses in 
COSLA but they realised that their position could improve if they too 
held pre-me«tings. This "if you can't beat them .•. " argument was ex-
pressed in public by Kenneth Clark Chief Executive of the Borders Re-
gion: "Some of our councillors have calculated," hj'! told the press, 
"that the representatives of the smaller authorities could outvote 
those from the central belt if we got ourselves organised. It is a 
pity it has come to that but it has."{l9 ) The Borders Region and dis-
tricts decided to convene a meeting of rural authorities in Perth in 
October 1977. Twenty-two authorities were represented- the regions 
and districts of: Borders, Dumfries and Galloway, Grampian and Tay-
side, but excluding Aberdeen and Dundee districts. A working party was 
formed and further meetings in Perth convened to discuss amendments 
to the constitution. 
These meetings showed the extent of rural dissatisfaction and 
helped justify their complaints, but for the Independent authorities 
the success of such political caucuses created problems. As Peter 
Daniels points out: " .•. by meeting together as a group and forming 
'group decisions' they were prejudicing their position as indepen-
dents." Moreover, by involving Conservative members from rural areas 
in these meetings "they were leaving themselves open to the very 
charge that they were levelling against COSLA - that its proceedings 
were becoming politicised."(
2
0) The participants in the Perth meet-
ings the "unholy alliance" of Conservatives and Independents, to 
borrow the sobriquet of COSLA 1 s first President, Sir George Sharp -
were soon denounced as little more than an anti-Labour group. There 
was nothing surprising about this tag since Independents in local 
government have commonly been seen by Labour as Tories in disguise. 
In this instance at least there was truth in the assertion that the 
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Independents were partisan. There is little doubt that some of the 
prime movers in the Perth meetings not only realised the strength of 
rural authorities if organised within COSLA, but also calculated that 
they could hold the balance of power more effectively if they aligned 
themselves with the Conservatives and deposed Labour from its dominant 
position. 
This bid for power was most apparent at the 1978 Annual Meeting 
when the rural authorities supported Conservative candidates for Presi-
dent and Vice-President. But before this meeting the Perth contingent 
submitted a number of constitutional amendments to the Convention Po-
licy Committee, most of which were designed to shift power away from 
the urban authorities. One of the amendments proposed that no author-
ity have more than two representatives on any committee. In effect 
this meant that Strathclyde Regional Council's representation on all 
committees, already small in relation to population would be cut by 
half. Another amendment proposed to increase the power of the Conven-
tion meeting by allowing it to amend, reverse or refer back decisions 
taken by Convention committees. The effect of this amendment would be 
to shift power from Committees to the full Convention on which the 
smaller authorities had a majority. The Policy Committee refused to 
support either of these amendments. But the Perth contingent decided 
to submit them to the 1978 Annual Meeting - the body empowered to 
amend the constitution - without the backing of the Policy Committee. 
Their decision to submit was vindicated by the result of the vote. 
By fifty-six votes to fifty-one the meeting supported the Borders 
amendment which gave no authority more than two representatives on 
any committee. The rural authorities were also successful ~n securing 
the election of Sir David Montgomery to the post of Vice-President: 
the Conservative Vice-Convener of Tayside Region defeated Charles 
O'Halloran of Strathclyde Region. The rural authorities were however 
defeated on two counts. The amendment designed to shift power from 
committees to the full Convention was rejected. They also narrowly 
failed to secure the election of the candidate they had backed for 
President. By two votes, Labour's Tom Clarke, Provost of Monklands 
District and outgoing Vice-President, defeated the Conservative Pro-
vost of Bearsden & Milngavie District, Tom Young, the candidate whom 
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many o£ the rural authorities had decided to support. 
It is now popularly believed in COSLA that many authorities had 
scarcely cast their vote in favour o£ the Borders amendment before 
they were rueing their decision. There are a number o£ explanations 
£or such a rapid change o£ heart. First there is the £act that some 
o£ the rural Independent authorities began to realise that the Perth 
meetings and the Borders amendments had been more 'political' than 
they had thought. The political aspect became clear at the Annual 
Meeting since the leaders o£ the rural authorities who had met in 
Perth were backing Tom Young £or the Presidency. As a Conservative 
Provost £rom a suburban district in Strathclyde, he was £ar £rom be-
ing representative o£ Independent rural authorities. This decision 
could no doubt be defended in terms o£ Realpolitik, but it neverthe-
less made plain that one indirect object o£ the Perth meetings was to 
depose Labour Party councillors £rom their controlling positions in 
COSLA. Second, many authorities voting £or the constitutional changes 
did not think that they would win the vote. They saw their action as 
a form o£ protest and never pondered its likely e££ect. I£ they had, 
they would have realised that it jeopardised the existence o£ the 
Convention. Strathclyde Regional Council were so aggrieved at their 
cut in representation that they were threatening withdrawal £rom 
COSLA - an act which would have ended Scotland's single association. 
Yet Strathclyde's threat could easily have been foreseen. After 
all was it likely that Strathclyde,which paid one third o£ the Con-
ventiorlS annual budget and contained one hal£ o£ Scotland's popula-
tion,would accept representation on executive committees equivalent 
to that o£ authorities approximately one-eigth its size? Irrespective 
o£ the importance o£ such additional representation, was it plausible 
to believe that Strathclyde would, with equanimity, accept the out-
come o£ what appeared as a politically motivated attack? The break-
up o£ COSLA was thus the most likely outcome o£ the success o£ the 
Borders amendment. The rural authorities who had voted £or such a 
change in the constitution had felt genuinely aggrieved and irritated 
that a £ew authorities were calling the tune, but many considered the 
demise o£ a single association £or Scotland too big a price to pay to 
have their grievances set right. 
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was 
The rural authorities' support £or the constitutional amendments 
roundly criticised by Scottish politicians and political commenta-
tors. A Scotsman editorial criticised the amendments as being unfair 
to Strathclyde Region and claimed 11 ••• the dispute which threatens 
political confrontation and it is 
non-political guise."( 2 l) Sec-
Party to which the rural Inde-
the future o£ COSLA is a straight 
ironic that it should be cloaked in a 
tions o£ the Conservative Party - the 
pendents had informally allied themselves within the Convention -
also denounced the action. Councillor Leonard Turpie, Conservative 
Group Leader on Strathclyde Regional Council, criticised the action 
and called £or an extraordinary meeting o£ COSLA to review the de-
cision. Less predictably the Conservatives on Renfrew District Coun-
cil also supported moves to reverse the amendments. It is easy to 
understand why external opinion should have been so hostile to the 
Borders amendment. Even a cursory glance at the original constitution 
shows the extent to which large authorities compromised on representa-
tion in order to get the Convention o££ the ground. The sight o£ 
smaller authorities, exploiting their numerical strength, and round-
ing on Strathclyde Region won them little more than opprobrium £rom 
people outside COSLA. 
Since the source o£ urban power within the Convention was not 
directly related to representation the amendment to cut the represen-
tation o£ large authorities was a blunt instrument. Even the suppor-
ters o£ the Borders amendment began to realise this shortly after 
their success. Within weeks o£ the Annual Meeting there was pressure 
within COSLA to look at the implications o£ the constitutional amend-
ments in order to stave o££ Strathclyde's threatened withdrawal. Some 
o£ the initiative £or a review came £rom councils - districts in Gram-
pian, £or example - which had been participants in the Perth meetings. 
On a motion submitted by Strathclyde Regional Council, the Conven-
tion Policy Committee agreed to set up a canst tution review sub-
committee, comprising representatives o£ a district or a regional 
authority within each o£ the nine regions o£ Scotland. The precise 
remit o£ the subcommittee was to consider the representation o£ mem-
ber authorities on the Convention and its committees, their £inan-
cial contributions and their voting rights. Its first task was to 
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write to all authorities asking them to comment 
tution. 
In January 1979 the subcommittee issued a report of the comments 
received from authorities together with its own recommendations for 
constitutional change. Given the Borders amendment, the major issue 
was the representation of member authorities. A few authorities fav-
oured maintaining the constitut:con as amended at the 1978 Annual 
ing. A slightly larger number desired the constitution to revert to 
its original form. Other authorities desired changes in representa-
tion on the full Convention which would boost Strathclyde Region's 
sence. No clear pattern emerged from these observations. The lack of 
detail, the diversity and the vagueness of the comments meant that 
subcommittee could accede to Strathclyde Region's suggestions. In 
many cases the subcommittee followed, almost to the letter, consti-
tutional changes proposed by Strathclyde. Accordingly, it recommended 
that Strathclyde Region's representation on joint committees should 
more or less restored to what had existed prior to the 1978 Annual 
Meeting. Risking the creation of large, unwieldy committees, the 
committees were increased from twenty-eight to forty members and 
Strathclyde's share of the places was fixed at five (1~). Compare 
this with the 14% awarded under the original constitution and the 7% 
allocated after the Borders amendment. Strathclyde was given increased 
representation on the full Convention - the body which was weighted 
in favour of the smaller authorities. The total number of representa-
tives was increased from one hundred and forty-three to one hundred 
and fifty. Five of these places were given to Strathclyde Region thus 
bringing its total representation to ten. 
The subcommittee, in line with most member authorities, did not 
think that COSLA should depart from the principle of "one man, one 
vote", since it preferred to give weight to population aize through 
progressive representation. Finance was another subject which the 
subcommittee and constituent authorities thought should be left un-
touched. The system whereby COSLAts finance was derived 75% from 
regions and 25% from districts - with Strathclyde Regional Council 
contributing one third of the total - was continued. 
Acting only on the comments received by Strathclyde, a number of 
122 
constitutional changes were proposed by the subcommittee. The first 
of these concerned the election of the President and Vice-President. 
Instead of these officers being elected annually with the possibility 
of re-election for a further year, it proposed that their term should 
be fixed for two years. Moreover, the subcommittee proposed that, 
instead of the gentleman's agreement already in operation, the con-
stitution should stipulate that the presidency and vice-presidency 
rotate between regional and district members. Another proposed amend-
ment was that district and regional members should not submit motions, 
move amendments or vote on matters not relevant to their type of auth-
ority. For example, regional members would not be permitted to vote 
on housing matters. The subcommittee further proposed that any amend-
ments to the constitution, or the adoption of a new constitution 
should be passed only if districts and regions voted separately and 
if both tiers had a majority voting in favour. (
22
) 
The report made a number of comments on and proposals for the 
spread of chairmanships and appointments to outside bodies between 
member authorities. since, as we have seen, this had been an issue 
raised by many rural authorities. The subcommittee argued that it was 
desirable that no authority should enjoy more than two chairmanships 
and wished "to place on record their view that when making appoint-
ments, committees of the Convention must make an effort to ensure that 
there is no undue concentration of office bearers within any one 
authority."( 23 ) The subcommittee did not feel that they could do any 
more than remonstrate on the subject since committees must also be 
free to choose the individuals they wanted for chairmen. A similar 
exhortation was made about appoint~ents to outside bodies. In this 
case, however, the report recommended that from time to time the 
list of these appointments should be submitted to the Convention Po-
licy Committee so that they could gauge the balance. If this was un-
satisfactory they would comment, but not over-rule. 
In February 1979 the Policy Committee put the subcommittee's 
proposals to the full Convention for comments and voting. Although 
they were overwhelmingly accepted this could only be regarded as a 
dummy-run since constitutional amendments had to be passed by the 
Annual Meeting, not scheduled to meet until June. But a procedural 
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point raised by Ettrick and Lauderdale 
fication. A few days before the Annual Meeting the Council 
that it proposed to challenge the legality of any 
ments at the meeting. The constitution stipulated 
ties be given twenty-one days notice of proposed amendments and this
had not been done. At the Annual Meeting it was clear that no other 
authority supported Ettrick and Lauderdale's bid to prevent the new 
constitution being adopted. The Council were legally accurate, but 
many authorities argued that no council could complain that it had 
not been properly informed of amendments since these had been dis-
cussed and voted on at a full Convention meeting only a few months 
before. The Council pressed their objection, however, and the 
did not take place. This action forced COSLA yet again into a 
tutional crisis. Dick Stewart, Labour Group leader on Strathclyde 
Region, intimated that members of his authority were unlikely to 
accept a further delay of a year, until the next Annual Meeting, to 
have their representation on committees restored, and so the chances 
were that Strathclyde Region would leave the Convention. At the 
minute a compromise was reached: the 1980 Annual Meeting would be 
brought forward to January and the new constitution would 
then. In the short term this compromise benefitted Strathclyde Reg-
ion but, as we shall see later, in the long term it blighted the 
political position of the whole Labour Group. 
Ettrick and Lauderdale's successful attempt to prevent the Con-
vention from ratifying the new constitution at the 1979 Annual Meet-
ing makes little apparent sense since the February meeting had given 
overwhelming support for its adoption, and since any obstruction of 
what were clearly the expressed wishes of COSLA members could only 
win the district a dishonourable reputation. Yet their Provost, 
Andrew Tully, argues that the action was quite rational. ( 24 ) He 
claims that his authority was particularly concerned that in June 
1979 COSLA members were insufficiently aware of the dangers inherent 
in the proposal that districts and regions vote separately on con-
stitutional change. His authority believed this would give a few big 
regions the chance to veto any constitutional change. Delaying the 
ratification of the new constitution, Provost Tully claims, gave them 
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~ore time to lobby against this clause. Their lobby was successful. By 
seventy-two votes to fifty-two votes the January 1980 Annual Meeting 
voted to delete this provision from the new constitution. Attempts to 
delete the clause preventing districts and r:gions from moving motions 
or voting on matters for which their kind of authority had no respon-
sibility were, however, unsuccessful and the new constitution was 
accepted, almost intact. 
Thus ended the episode of constitutional conflict which had en-
dangered the very existence of COSLA. For the time being, at least, 
scottish local government could retain its single association. 
IV 
Those involved in the formation of COSLA must have been dismayed 
at the series of events which threatened to tear it apart. But they 
could hardly have been surprised. The architects of the original con-
stitution never underestimated the problems facing a single associa-
tion. They realised that its continued existence 
tirely dependent on good-will. One major problem 
and success were en-
emanated from the 
structure of local government in Scotland. Since we have a two tier 
system with massive discrepancies in the size of authorities, it is 
difficult to devise a satisfactory formula for representation within 
the Convention. In England and Wales too there are disparities be-
tween authorities but these are not so great. There, for example, the 
largest county has twelve times the population of the smallest, where-
as in Scotland the largest region has twenty-six times the population 
of the smallest. It is only when we compare different kinds of authori-
ty in England - counties and districts, for example - that enormous 
disparities emerge. But this is not so important to the associations 
in England and Wales since theyrepresent different kinds of authority. 
This leads us to consider one of the major problems facing COSLA. 
As a single association it represents the views of regional, district 
and island authorities. Yet there is conflict within Scottish local 
government between district and regional 
due to tension over concurrent functions 
also due to the resentment many district 
regions. The intensity of such resentment 
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councils. This is partially 
such as planning. But it is 
councillors feel towards the 
varies as do the remedies 
proposed. Many district councillors desire a transfer of some 
functions, such as social work, to 
mostly those representing the four 
area could sustain a single purpose authority. Some councillors 
pecially Scottish Nationalist and Liberals desire the complete 
tion of regional councils. This conflict has played some part 
COSLA crisis. If rural authorities were angry that in 1977-78 
of the four joint committee chairmanships went to members 
ties in the central belt, district authorities, even from 
were annoyed that all four went to regional members. 
ment of 1978 was successful because the rural authorities -
which were districts - managed to exploit the resentment of 
ban districts towards the regional councils. 
The Association of Metropolitan Authorities (A.M.A.) is 
English and Welsh association to have a comparable problem. It 
sents five different kinds of authority: metropolitan counties 
as Greater Manchester and Merseyside, metropolitan districts, such 
Bradford and Liverpool, London boroughs, the Greater London Council 
and the Inner London Education Authority. Metropolitan 
districts, however, have little in common - other than 
status - and this creates conflict within 
flict partially arises because most of the metropolitan counties' 
expenditure is on services such as police, fire and highways over 
which they have minimum control. Their representation in the 
was severely reduced in 1975 because they do not have 
lity for important local government functions such as 
social work. In the past 
dissatisfied with their treatment in the A.M.A. that they have 
ened to Jo~n the Association of County Councils. But political 
such as party balance, have acted as a temporary restraint. ( 25 ) 
The conflict between different tYPes of authorities in England 
and Wales over rights and responsibilities is, however, usually play-
ed out between the associations. The Labour Government's proposals 
for Organic Change in Local Government, mooted in 1978-79,provide us 
with an example. (
26
) These proposals suggested the transfer of func-
tions like education from the county councils to some of the larger 
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district councils - a transfer which would have partly restored cities 
like Nottingham to their former position. Predictably the Association 
of county Councils (A.C.C.) opposed this proposal, since some of their 
roerober counties would have lost functions, while the Association of 
oistrict Councils (A.D.C.) -instrumental in having such proposals 
put forward - was enthusiastic. 
The cleavage between urban and rural, which at one point threat-
ened the existence 0 f COSLA, is likewise a constant source of con-
flict between the associations. The A.M.A. 
iation which represents urban authorities. 
is by definition an assoc-
This leaves the A.C.C. 
and the A.D.C. with a rural bias. The most important bone of conten-
tion between the urban and rural associations is the allocation of 
central government finance. After a switch of resources in 1977-78 
in favour of the urban authorities, the annual conflict over the 
allocation of R.S.G. was particularly evident in 1979. The A.M.A. 
produced a pamphlet entitled Supporting the Cities, arguing the case 
for roore finance for urban areas, while the A.C.C. published ~ 
Deprivation which argued an antithetical case. (
27
) 
Such a collision of interests between the A.C.C. and the A.M.A. 
occurred despite the fact that both were Tory controlled and so in a 
strong position to evolve a common view. The extent of the hostility 
between urban and rural authorities on the allocation of R.S.G. is 
so important that it cuts across party political ties. In 1979 Tag 
Taylor, then Conservative President of the A.M.A., graphically illus-
trated the point. After commenting that his hopes for consensus be-
tween the three Tory controlled associations had been "misplaced" he 
added: "The attitude of the shires is so different from the urban 
Tories that I sometimes wonder who my friends are. 11 (
2
S) Indeed, gi-
ven the intensity of the conflict, an interesting question about 
COSLA's history is not why there has been tension between urban and 
rural authorities, but how these authorities have managed to co-
exist at all. 
As we have seen, in England and Wales the conflict between ur-
ban and rural authorities, like the present conflict between central 
such that it over-rides party affiliation. 
party politics is unimportant in the 
and local government, is 
But this is not to say that 
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English associations. Each of the three has an identifiable party 
bias. The A.C.C. and the A.D.C. have considerable Conservative maj-
orities, while the A.M.A. is usually under Labour control. Only an 
exceptionally bad bout of election results for Labour in 1977 and 
1978 lost the Party its control of the A.M.A. Usually the battles 
between the A.M.A. and the other associations have 
flavour. In COSLA too the urban-rural conflict has an important 
political dimension. The urban areas, including of 
regions - Strathclyde and Lothian - are Labour controlled, while 
rural authorities are predominantly Independent or Conservative. 
we have seen, the alliance of Independents and Conservatives had 
rural dimension but was also based on a hostility to the Labour 
So far, then, we have identified three main divisions within 
COSLA, all of which contributed to the 1978 crisis: urban-rural, 
region-district and party political. It is because divisions were 
related that there was a strong impetus for change. A rural Conser-
vative district, for example, had three separate, yet reinforcing, 
reasons for wishing the clipping of Strathclyde's wings. But not all 
councils of this profile acted in this way. Social scientists may 
olate those variables which influence people's behaviour but can 
predict how they will behave. In our case the three divisions were 
undoubtedly factors which motivated some councillors to organise 
against the industrial regions. But in other instances these divisions
were not enough. For some authorities, apparently susceptible to anti-
Strathclyde feeling, .it was loyalty to the West of Scotland which 
vented them from supporting the initiatives of the Perth faction. 
So far we have discussed party politics in COSLA only as one 
element in its trifarious cleavages. But this is a subject worth 
studying in its own right. It is only if we understand the develop-
ment of party politics in the Convention that we can understand its 
ethos and its role in local government politics. Let us start by 
looking at party politics in COSLA up to the 1980 district council 
elections. 
The prevailing ethos in COSLA until 1980 emanated from Indepen-
dent politics and, in terms of British local government in the 1970s, 
marked out the'Convention as a somewhat apolitical organisation. Its 
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lack of politicisation becomes most clear if we begin by outlining the 
acutely partisan and consciously political nature of the English and 
Welsh associations. Such partisanship is expressed in the existence 
of the three associations. During the negotiations for a single assoc-
iation it became clear that a major stumbling block was the attitude 
of the predecessor to the A.M.A. - the Association of Metropolitan 
corporations. The urban Labour authorities, who were in the majority 
in the A.M.C., calculated that their political interests were best 
served by maintaining a separate association for metropolitan authori-
ties as this would usually be controlled by Labour. (
29
) A single ass-
ociation, on the other hand, was most likely to be controlled by Tory 
dominated county and district councils. 
As we have already seen, each of the three associations is clear-
ly identified with a political party - the A.C.C. and the A.D.C. being 
staunchly Conservative and the A.M.A. usually being Labour. Since the 
A.M.A. is the only association which does not have an entrenched 
majority group, it is the most politically organised of the associations 
and, provides the most effective comparison for COSLA. A prime example 
of the A.M.A.'s partisan nature arose in 1978 when the Conservatives 
first won a majority of representatives on the Association: the 
Labour leaders resigned from all their posts since they were now the 
minority party and no longer had a mandate to lead. These resignations 
occurred despite the fact that the Labour leaders had been elected 
until the following A.G.M. Subsequently the beginning of the Associa-
tion's year was moved forward to July so that changes in the political 
balance caused by council elections could be reflected in the new 
association. In return for the Labour resignations, a number of altera-
tions were made in the Association's affairs. For example, proportion-
al representation of parties on sub-committees and appointments to 
other bodies was introduced, including the important Consultative 
Council for Local Government Finance and the pay negotiation bodies. 
Moreover, to obviate the need for party leaders to secure a place 
on the Policy Committee through "conventional channels", the con-
stitution was amended to guarantee the majority and minority party 
leaders a seat ex officio. The proceedings of the A.M.A. are also 
clearly partisan. General meetings of the Association are used for 
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ritualistic confrontations between the two major parties. In NovembA
1979, for example, the Labour Group leader Councillor Jack Smart, 
tabled an 'opposition' motion deploring the terms of the Conservati 
Government's R.S.G. settlement. The motion was lost but only on 
casting vote of the Conservative Chairman, Tag Taylor. The vote 
fleeted the small Conservative majority on the A.M.A. 
If we compare this highly partisan association with 
how non-party political COSLA 1 s proceed'.ngs are. 
unlike the A.C.C. or A.D.C., COSLA does not have a guaranteed 
ty for any one party. In the 1977-80 period the Labour Party 
ally constituted the biggest single group, leaving the 
holding the balance of power. And this controlling 
COSLA being identified with any political party. This can be seen 
the choice of Presidents both in the 1977-80 period and before, 
Labour had a majority but was not organised. 
The first President of the Association was Sir George Sharp, 
had previously been a Chairman of the Scottish A.C.c., and who, 
though a Labour councillor, was not seen as a strongly partisan 
He was elected in preference to two other Labour candidates: 
Shaw, Convener of Strathclyde Region and Peter Wilson, Convener 
Lothian Region both of whom were clearly associated with the 
Party. Sharp was also elected in preference to a Conservative can-
didate: Sandy Mutch from Grampian Region. Sharp was succeeded by 
Provost Tom Clarke from Monklands District Council who, although 
strongly identified with the Labour Party, was nevertheless seen as 
a relatively neutral figure who had pledged himself to maintaining 
the unity of the Convention. The current President, William Fitzger-
ald is a Conservative from Tayside Regional Council. Of the 
is probably most keen to play an apolitical role along the lines of 
a provost or neutral head of state. As a former Provost of Dundee 
is used to minority politics and has committed himself to a non-
partisan stance. ( 30) 
In comparison with the A.M.A., COSLA's constitution disregards 
party politics. Take, for example, the election of the President 
Vice-President. In all three English and Welsh associations they are 
elected annually and are thus sensitive to changes in party political
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balance. In the case of the A.M.A. the annual meeting is timed to 
correspond with changes in political strength. In COSLA, on the other 
hand, these office-bearers are now elected for two years. Thus since 
MaY 1980 we have had a Labour majority on the Convention but a Conserva-
tive leadership. COSLA's ethos was established at a time when the 
political groups were not well organised and when the Independents were 
important and so leaders without majority support, are not required 
to resign. The meetings of the full Convention also display the 
extent to which party politics are suppressed within COSLA. In 
England and Wales. equivalent meetings are used as a forum for de-
bating party political points but in COSLA virtually no discussion 
of important issues occurs at the Convention meetings. All signifi-
cant debate takes place in committee meetings where, it is argued, 
privacy keeps party political point scoring to a minimum. 
In a sense, then, we can see that the COSLA of the 1970s was 
an •underpoliticised' organisation: underpoliticised in that its 
ethos ran counter to developments within local government. (
3
l) Since 
reorganisation local government has become increasingly 'national-
ised': more councillors have been elected on party tickets and 
issues have become more influenced by the national parties. (
32
) Yet 
the Independents who remain, and who are likely to do so for the 
foreseeable future, still cling to the idea of a non-partisan assoc-
iation which suppresses overt political conflict and identification. 
Party politics may be suppressed within the Convention but this 
is not to say that political groups are unorganised. Labour members 
were the first to organise themselves: the Labour Group was estab-
lished in February 1976, eight months after the Convention had been 
formed. The lack,of a formal Labour Group at the inaugural meeting 
is witnessed by the fact· that three Labour candidates stood for the 
Presidency (although even after the Group had formed there were 
occasions when more than one Labour candidate stood for committee 
chairmanships). Ostensibly the Group exists to discuss COSLA agenda 
items, tactics and nominations for offices, but many Labour members 
think it is a rather ineffectual organisation. There is little back-
up from the Labour party itself. In England and Wales the associations' 
Labour Groups are serviced and advised by the Local Government De-
131 
partment at Head Office.<
33
) But in Scotland the Scottish Council 
the Labour Party - the Regional Office to which COSLA Labour 
should turn - has taken little interest and 
support. Moreover, unlike England and Wales where the Labour 
in the three associations are co-opted on to the National 
Committee's Regional and Local Government sub-committees, 
Labour Group Leader does not by right have a seat on the Local 
ernment sub-committee of the Scottish Council of the 
An additional problem faced by the Labour Group is time. 
ings are held prior to committee or Convention meetings, 
many of the members have to travel some distance there is usually 
little time for discussion and attendance for the entire meeting 
low. 
Factors of time and geography are continually cited as 
to proper participation in COSLA politics. The Conservative 
finds that poor attendance at meetings is a problem 
fore committees frequently do not happen. But there 
between the Conservative Group, formed in 1977, and the Party 
the case with the Labour Group. The Conservative Group Leader 
right a seat on the Party's Scottish Local Government 
the Group as a whole benefits from the backing of its 
Central Office circulates all members with notices of meetings and 
this secretarial back-up is a boon to the Group. For example, in 
choosing a candidate for the 1980 Presidency they found it easy to 
hold a postal ballot of all their members to decide their nominee. 
Some argue that the Conservatives are much better 
this is attributable to the fact that for Central Office and coun-
cillors alike, local government politics is a novelty and that, in 
the first flush of enthusiasm, they have given more time to their 
Group's organisation and tactics. 
The Liberal Party and the SNP also have councillors active in 
COSLA. In both cases they do not operate a proper group system but 
there are strong ties between the councillors and their parties. 
All SNP district councillors meet together with Party officials in 
an Association of District Councillors and in this forum discuss 
items relevant to COSLA. It is only if special agenda items arise, 
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which theY have not had time to discuss, that they have a pre-meeting. 
Since theY are few in number they always decide individually how they 
will vote in committees. Liberal councillors similarly meet regular-
lY with Party members and officials. In their case the forum is a bi-
annual conference in which COSLA matters may arise, but members con-
sider discussion there relevant only to specific policy problems and 
do not view 
party line. 
it as political caucusing or binding individuals to a 
From this brief run-down of the operation of political parties 
in the Convention we can see that, paradoxically, it was the Inde-
.Pendents who were best organised in 1977-78. While the two major 
parties found it difficult to hold pre-meetings, the Independents, 
with the enthusiasm of converts, held a series of meetings in Perth 
There is no question that in the short term the to discuss tactics. 
Independents' organisation paid 
through their organisation they 
off, and some of them believe that 
defeated the Labour Party at its own 
game. However, the rural authorities did not simply manage to 'dish' 
the Labour Group through dint of good organisation for, as we shall 
see, the tactics of the Labour Group also contributed to their de-
feat. 
The Labour Group, 
bers, have sustained a 
particularly Strathclyde Regional Council mem-
series of defeats within COSLA. For example, 
Sir George Sharp, who was 
beat Strathclyde Region's 
on anti-Labour votes, elected predominantly 
Geoff Shaw for the first COSLA Presidency. 
by the small-In June 1978 central belt authorities were outmanoeuvred 
er districts and Strathclyde Region's representation was cut. At the 
same meeting Charles 0 1Halloran of Strathclyde Region was defeated 
for the Vice-P~esidency by Sir David Montgomery, a Conservative backed 
by many rural authorities. At the 1980 Annual Meeting Charles O'Hall-
oran was yet again defeated by the Conservative candidate. John 
Sewell from Aberdeen District Council, Labour's Vice-Presidential can-
dictate was also 
The simple 
defeated. 
explanation for such defeats is that Labour was in 
the minority in the Convention during this period. However, a number 
of these defeats can be better explained in terms of political judge-




ment was passed. The Convention Policy Committee under a Labour 
man had discussed all the Borders amendments and rejected them. 
they were moved at the Annual Meeting the Policy Committee 
stated its opposition. A number of speakers from the floor 
case in favour of the amendments but, in line with 
decision, no-one argued the case against. This was interpreted by 
some COSLA members as a further example of the arrogance of the 
Labour members who disregarded rural authorities and believed that 
they did not have to defend their position. It is possible that, on 
such a narrow vote - fifty-six votes to fifty-one - the 
decision gained the Borders the extra support necessary to win. 
A further example of poor Labour tactics occurred at the 1979 
Annual Meeting when the new constitution could not be adopted 
of Ettrick and Lauderdale's objection. Conservatives in COSLA 
ed to Strathclyde Region that a compromise, which they would accept, 
was to bring forward the date of the 1980 Annual Meeting to January. 
Strathclyde Regional Council members convinced the Labour Group that 
their council might not stay in COSLA if they had to wait a further 
year to have their representation restored. (35 ) The Conservatives' 
compromise was, therefore, accepted by the Labour Group and finally 
endorsed by the Convention. But in accepting this Labour Group mem-
bers were creating problems for themselves over the election of the 
next President and Vice-President. If the Annual Meeting had been 
held in June 1980, as originally planned, Labour would then have the 
benefits of increased representation due to likely gains in the May 
1980 district elections. In January 1980 Labour was in a minority on 
the Convention and could not secure the election of their candidates 
at the Annual Meeting, but by June 1980, thanks to the district elec-
tions, Labour could have commanded a majority of votes. 
Several COSLA Labour members now argue that it was unlikely that 
Strathclyde Region would have withdrawn from the Convention after 
tempers had cooled and they had been able to appraise the position. 
But, with this threat hanging over them and in the heat of the moment, 
the Labour Group backed a decision which had adverse political conse-
quences. for them: a decision which privately amuses many Conservatives 
and Independents. Thereafter Labour did not help to counteract the 
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effect of their decision by lobbying strongly on behalf of O'Halloran 
or Sewell. Compare this with the Tories' tactics as they actually wrote 




members introducing their candidates and asking for 
But how can we explain the actions of the Labour Group in COSLA? 
ane possible explanation is that some of the key members of the Labour 
Group come from regional councils with large Labour majorities. On 
strathclyde Regional Council, for example, Labour has almost three times 
as many seats as the Conservatives, the second largest party. This means 
that many influential Labour Group members are unused to lobbying for 
support on the Council for their decisions. Strathclyde councillors 
have accepted small representation on COSLA when, of all authorities, 
they could have decided to forge out on their own. But like some other 
Labour authorities they have not adapted to the fact that COSLA cannot 
easily accommodate overt party politics and that persuasion is needed 
if their proposals are to be passed. It is ironic that in 1977-78 the 
Independents and Conservativ~s - the new boys to local government 
caucusing - outmanoeuvred the apparatchiks of the Labour Party. 
v 
From a study of COSLA's short history it is clear that the lack 
of a coherently organised, majority party has made a great impact on 
the Convention's affairs. The massive electoral defeat sustained by 
the Labour Party in the 1977 district council elections placed the 
Independents, in coalition with the Conservatives, in the ascendant 
The 1980 district elections changed all that and now the position. 
future of 
1975-77 period, 
COSLA politics is uncertain. (
37 ) We cannot look back at the 
when Labour also had a majority, for clues about what 
might happen now, since the Labour Group was then at an embryonic 
stage and since the climate of local government politics has changed. 
But one thing is certain: Conservative leadership of a Convention 
with a Labour majority is bound to create tensions. The Conservative 
President and Vice-President have been elected until June 1982, but 
since Labour have a majority on the Convention and all important 
committees, including the Convention Policy Committee, they must be 
tempted to force the leaders to resign. Yet challenging the Conser-
vative leadership in COSLA may be tantamount to challenging the rural 
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authorities who have little sympathy for the Labour dominated indus+~
rial areas. Thus any Labour Party attempt to oust the leadership 
might reawaken the conflicts of 1978-79. 
In normal times it would seem implausible 
to recapture the leadership of the Convention, since most important 
decisions are taken in committees. However, in the present climate 
confrontation between the Conservative Goverrunent and local authori-
ties, it would be significant if Labour had formal control over 
The President and Vice-President are spokesmen for COSLA, and so if 
they fail to speak the Convention's political voice is not heard. 
This is exactly what is happening now. Fitzgerald has promised to 
these are not his the Convention even if 
Tayside Regional Council 
articulate the views of 
As the Convener of 
he has complied with the 
Government and has cut back on spending, but as President of COSLA 
has criticised the Government's public spending cuts. <39 ) But the 
issue for Labour will not be whether the leadership occasionally 
a political line acceptable to the majority of COSLA members 
decisive question is whether Fitzgerald, temperamentally or politic-
ally,will be prepared to use his office to argue strongly against 
Government. Many doubt he will. Thus no matter how much Labour au 
ties argue their individual case against cuts or changes in local gov-
of COSLA stands in the 
for COSLA is the best forum for them to 
against the Secretary of State's proposals.
ernment finance, the Conservative leadership 
way of Labour councillors 
state a strong public case 
The significance of a party political clash within COSLA may be 
offset, however, by the resurgence of other rivalries. Most notable 
in the year ahead will be the Stodart Committee's proposals for the 
reform of local government. COSLA has declined to give evidence to 
the Committee of Inquiry, but it is unlikely that it will be able to 
keep its distance and not get involved in comment on the proposals. 
This will create tensions within the Convention and the joint committ-
ees and within the political groups. Indeed although each party has 
an official position on local government reform, not all councillors 
accept the party line. It is likely that political groups in COSLA 
will be as racked by dissension as the Convention itself. 
But what of the future of COSLA 1 s wider political role? A common 
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criticism of local authority associations is that they are merely 
reactive bodies who offer advice and comments on draft legislation 
and government policies but who do not take a creative part in de-
cision making. (40) In the 1970s many people thought that local gov-
ernment reform and the establishment of a single Scottish association 
might change this. ( 4l) COSLA1 s secretary, Graham Speirs, for example, 
argued: "If MPs can draft private member's bills and present them 
to Parliament, then the Convention with its knowledge of local gov-
ernment should be prepared to draft legislation and present it to 
the Scottish Office."( 4Z) But this has not happened and COSLA still 
plays a reactive, defensive role. There is little chance that this 
will change since it is inadequately staffed and financed and this 
alone prevents the Convention from taking initiatives. 
From a local government perspective, COSLA can only be seen as 
an improvement on the disunited English and Welsh associations, if 
it has bettered or successfully defended the position of local auth-
orities. In this paper, we have not been able to evaluate this. 
Firstly such an evaluation could only arise from a major piece of 
research which monitored COSLA1 s influence on the governments' 
activities. Since COSLA committees meet in private and since deci-
sion-making in British government is notoriously secretive the ne-
cessary material might prove difficult to obtain. Secondly, the sig-
nificance of COSLA's influence on the Scottish Office could only be 
assessed by comparing it with the influence of the three English and 
Welsh associations on government. In other words, we could have to 
decide if COSLA 1 s influence is simply due to its role as a local auth-
ority association or if it is particularly strong by value of its 
unique role in Scottish local government. 
Definitive conclusions cannot be drawn from the material presen-
ted in this paper. But it has been possible to do two things: first 
to give some examples of COSLA's weakness as a local authority assoc-
iation and second, from a study of COSLA's constitution and history, 
to analyse why we may expect such weakness. Ironically the difficul-
ties which COSLA faces emanate from its alleged virtue. Because it 
is a single association it must reconcile the views of competing 




ence. The constitutional crisis itself weakened the organisation 
it made COSLA•s future uncertain and diverted energy from COSLA's 
other business. Further tensions have been generated by the failure 
to acknowledge the importance of party politics in local government. 
At a time when central government is seeking to erode further the 
financial autonomy of local authorities, COSLA is enfeebled by a 
leadership which does not command the support of a majority of COSLA 
members. 
In England and Wales there are three associations for local 
authorities. Undoubtedly this weakens the voice of local government 
and leads to open competition between different tiers. But, as we have
seen, to unite these competing interests within the organisation does 
not put an end to the conflicts. 
There is no reason to believe that Scottish local authorities 
have a better base from which to bargain or fight with 
ment than their English and Welsh counterparts. 
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